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Crowdfunding Delusions 
 




The idea behind crowdfunding is, in principle, an attractive one.  
Individuals band together via the Internet in support of a common 
cause—a political candidate, disaster relief, and the like.1  Business 
has not been immune to the phenomenon, with the enticing idea that 
small investors can pool together funds so that a company could 
produce a good or service.2  At first glance, the idea is intellectually 
appealing since it aspires to democratize funding beyond accredited 
investors.3  Think, for example of Pebble Technologies’ Bluetooth-
enabled watches: Using the crowdfunding platform Kickstarter, the 
company was able to crowdfund many times its initial objective.4  
 
 *  Professor of Law, University of San Francisco.  I thank the editors of the Hastings 
Business Law Journal for giving me the opportunity to present the ideas in this essay at the 
Journal’s Symposium on “Regulating the Disruption Economy” on March 20, 2015, in San 
Francisco, California. 
 1. Thomas Lee Hazen, Crowdfunding or Fraudfunding? Social Networks and the 
Securities Laws—Why the Specially Tailored Exemption Must Be Conditioned on Meaningful 
Disclosure, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1735, 1736 (2012) (“Crowdfunding is the fundraising analog to 
crowdsourcing, which refers to mass collaboration efforts through large numbers of people, 
generally using social media or the Internet.”); Migliozzi & Flatow, Securities Act Release No. 
9216, WL 2246317 (June 8, 2011) (“Crowdsourcing is the use of social media and the Internet to 
organize a large group of individuals to achieve a common goal. . . .”); see also Joan MacLeod 
Heminway & Shelden Ryan Hoffman, Proceed At Your Peril: Crowdfunding and the Securities 
Act of 1933, 78 TENN. L. REV. 879, 881 (2011) (“Crowdfunding includes a variety of business 
financing models that use the Internet.”). 
 2. See, e.g., C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws, 2012 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 5 [hereinafter Bradford, Crowdfunding] (“Crowdfunding is, as its name 
indicates, funding from the crowd—raising small amounts of money from a large number of 
investors.”). Various flavors of crowdfunding have been explored in the literature.  See id. at 
14–15 (“One can categorize crowdfunding into five types, distinguished by what investors are 
promised in return for their contributions: (1) the donation model; (2) the reward model; (3) the 
pre-purchase model; (4) the lending model; and (5) the equity model.”).  
 3. See infra notes 80–81 and accompanying text (discussing Regulation D).  
 4. See, e.g., Pebble Time Kickstarter Project Raised $20.3 Million, CNN MONEY, (Mar. 25, 
2015, 11:16 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/03/27/technology/pebble-time-most-funded-kick 
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Indeed, crowdfunding generates a buzz in the otherwise staid field of 
securities regulation.5 
Beyond all the hype, however, there is a curious incongruity.  On 
the one hand, there exist apparently successful crowdfunding sites 
such as Kickstarter and IndieGoGo6; on the other hand, more than 
three years after the Jumpstart Our Business Act (“JOBS Act”) 
mandated an equity crowdfunding exception, we are still waiting for 
final regulations from the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(“SEC”).7 
This essay begins by exploring this irony in Part I, arguing that 
existing crowdfunding sites carefully manage around a fundamental 
ambiguity in the securities laws—a surprisingly fuzzy definition of 
what a “security” is. 
Part II shifts to understanding the existing regulatory framework: 
both the federal crowdfunding statute and proposed rules, as well as 
other existing alternatives issuers might consider.  It starts by 
analyzing the contribution of the JOBS Act, the new section 4(a)(6) 
of the Securities Act of 1933 (“1933 Act”), and the SEC’s October 
2013 585-page proposed rules.  While well intentioned, it concludes 
that this legal framework is ultimately unworkable, largely due to the 
very high transaction costs imposed.  As such, to the extent the final 
rules are imminent, my prediction is that they will have little impact 
on actual fundraising practices.  Second, Part II surveys other 
potential alternatives to place crowdsourced securities—sections 
4(a)(2) and 4(a)(5), Regulation D, and Regulation A/A+, and even 
new state crowdfunding exemptions—but ultimately argues that none 
are attractive.  As such, it is far more likely that crowdfunding sites 
will continue to operate as they currently do, rather than subject 
themselves to any new crowdfunding rules or seek alternative 
exemptions. 
 
starter [hereinafter Pebble Time Kickstarter]. 
   5. See, e.g., Joan MacLeod Heminway, Crowdfunding and the Public/Private Divide in 
U.S. Securities Regulation, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 477, 477 (2014) [hereinafter Heminway, 
Public/Private] (“In less than ten years, this fusion of social media and traditional corporate 
finance—a mode of corporate finance through which firms raise investment capital by reaching 
out over the Internet to a broad, undifferentiated mass of potential investors—grew from a 
creative impulse to a movement that catalyzed federal legislative action.”). 
 6. See infra notes 28–31 and accompanying text.  
 7. See infra notes 34–53 and accompanying text.  
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Finally, Part III explores the implications of this pessimistic 
prediction along two dimensions.  First, it argues that, for all of its 
advantages, crowdfunding presents fundamental negatives that 
cannot be regulated away.  As such, we must face a stark choice: 
either prophylactically ban the activity, or allow it with few 
restrictions.  To think that we can craft a balanced regulatory 
framework for crowdfunding is delusional. 
Regardless of the direction securities law and policy gravitates 
towards, however, perhaps most important is to ponder crucial 
themes that the crowdfunding saga raises in a microcosm.  Some are 
more obvious; for example, how to fund small businesses, the relative 
institutional roles of Congress and the SEC, the effectiveness of 
disclosure, and the role of intermediaries.  Others are more subtle, 
such as bending the public/private distinction, uncoupling value-
added services from capital, and whether the wisdom or madness of 
crowds is consistent with the efficient market hypothesis.  Regardless, 
the real value of the contemporary crowdfunding saga may be to alert 
us to these challenging realities. 
 
II. CROWDFUNDING WITHOUT RULES? 
 
Section 5 of the Securities Act mandates that any security issued 
must either be registered or that the issuer must find a registration 
exemption.8  Given that an exemption for equity crowdfunding does 
not yet exist, then how do crowdfunding sites exist?9 
One possibility would be to argue that the issuer is a nonprofit or 
other charitable organization and thus, the security is exempt from 
registration under section 3(a)(4) of the 1933 Act.10  Assuming the 
 
 8. See Securities Act of 1933 §§ 5(a), (c), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e(a), (c) (2012). 
 9. See, e.g., Bradford, supra note 2, at 6 (“[C]rowdfunding does not mesh well with federal 
securities regulation.  Entrepreneurs seeking debt or equity financing through crowdfunding will 
often be selling securities, and securities offerings must be registered under the Securities Act of 
1933 . . . unless an exemption is available.”); Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 1, at 882 (“We 
became interested in this venture finance model because it has huge appeal in a number of 
obvious respects, yet we could not understand how some of the crowdfunding websites and 
crowdfunded ventures (especially those offering profit-sharing interests to funders) were 
complying with federal securities laws.”). 
 10. The Act exempts “[a]ny security issued by a person organized and operated exclusively 
for religious, educational, benevolent, fraternal, charitable, or reformatory purposes and not for 
pecuniary profit.”  Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12(g)(2)(D), 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g)(2)(D).  
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business is for-profit, however, this relatively narrow exemption 
would not be available—and even if it were exempt from registration, 
it would still be subject to the liability and antifraud provisions of the 
securities acts as a “security.”11 
As such, the basic manner in which crowdfunding sites might 
escape securities regulation would be to argue that what they are 
offering is not a “security.”12  This argument is only possible given a 
fundamental ambiguity in the federal securities laws.13 
 
A.   DEFINITION UNDER FEDERAL COMMON LAW 
 
The question of what constitutes a “security” is deceptively 
difficult.14  One of the supervening ironies of securities regulation is 
that we have an entire area of law devoted to regulating “securities,” 
yet we still do not have a clear definition of what these are.  To be 
sure, the 1933 Act does define the term,15 but those familiar with the 
 
Having a profit motive would disallow the exemption.  Compare SEC v. Children’s Hosp., 214 
F. Supp. 883 (D. Ariz. 1963) (exemption unavailable), with Deutsche Bank Microcredit Dev. 
Fund, SEC No-Action Letter, WL 1355511 (Apr. 8, 2011) (exemption available). 
 11. Notably sections 12(a)(2) and 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 and section 10(b) of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 
 12. See also Hazen, supra note 1, at 1737 (“Unlike raising money for charities or other 
nonprofit ventures, a business seeking investors through crowdfunding implicates the securities 
laws which provide investor protection by requiring disclosure and, in many instances, 
registration of securities offered to the public.”) (emphasis added). 
 13. See Joan MacLeod Heminway, What Is a Security in the Crowdfunding Era?, 7 OHIO 
ST. ENTREP. BUS. L. J. 335, 356 (2012) [hereinafter Heminway, What Is a Security] (“The advent 
of crowdfunding has put significant pressure on the regulation of securities under the 1933 Act 
and the 1934 Act, in general, and the definition of a security, in particular.”). 
 14. See id. at 353 (“The concept of a security—the subject (and an object) or securities 
regulation—is significantly more complex than it appears.”). 
 15. Securities Act of 1933, subsection 2(a)(1) states that: 
The term “security” means any note, stock, treasury stock, security future, 
security-based swap, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate 
of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust 
certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, 
investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a 
security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, 
any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security, certificate of 
deposit, or group or index of securities (including any interest therein or 
based on the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege 
entered into on a national securities exchange relating to foreign currency, 
or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a “security,” 
or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim 
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securities laws recognize that the definition is too broad to be 
workable. 
As such, the most relevant definition of “security” emerges from 
a United States Supreme Court case, SEC v. Howey,16 which focuses 
on the term “investment contract”17 and famously states: “an 
investment contract for the purposes of the Securities Act means a 
contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money 
in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the 
efforts of a promoter or third party.”18  The three components of the 
Howey test, then, focus on: (i) investment vs. consumption, (ii) 
common enterprise, and (iii) profits from the efforts of others.19  
There is rich case law exploring these factors.20 
 
B.   TESTING THE DEFINITION 
 
How do crowdfunding efforts stack up against this definition?21  
It is critical to note that if the crowdfunded instruments—whether 
equity or debt—offer the prospect of a financial return on investment, 




certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to 
or purchase, any of the foregoing. 
Securities Act of 1933 § 2(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2012).  This is rather broad definition, 
which is further muddied by the prefatory clause “unless the context otherwise requires.”  
Securities Act of 1933 § 2(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a) (2012). 
 16. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946); see also Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 
56 (1990) (notes); Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681 (1985) (closely held 
corporations).  Howey, however, remains by far the most significant articulation, and the most 
relevant for interests sold via crowdfunding sites. 
 17. The term appears as a separate category in section 2(a)(1) of the 1933 Act, but Howey 
has been used more generally to define the word “security.”  See Securities Act of 1933 § 
2(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1)(2012). 
 18. Howey, 328 U.S. at 298–99. 
 19. The word “solely” has effectively been de-emphasized in subsequent Supreme Court 
opinions.  See, e.g., United Hous. Found. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 n.16 (1975). 
 20. See, e.g., SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389 (2004); Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551 
(1982). 
 21. For detailed application of Howey to crowdfunding, see Heminway & Hoffman, supra 
note 1, at 885–906. 
 22. See Bradford, Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 31 (“Crowdfunding sites organized on the 
lending model probably are offering securities if the lender is promised interest.  Crowdfunding 
sites organized on the equity model are usually offering securities.”). 
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After all, the offering would be an “investment” and there would 
be the expectation of “profits” under Howey.23  Consider, for 
example the SEC’s cease-and-desist orders against 
BuyaBeerCompany.com,24 a putative campaign to purchase the Pabst 
Brewing Company, as well as Prosper Marketplace, which was 
offering crowdfunded debt instruments.25  Other crowdfunding sites 
offering instruments which would arguably meet the Howey 
definition, such as ProFounder and 33Needs, are now defunct.26 
But what about today’s popular crowdfunding sites such as 
Kickstarter and IndieGoGo?27  Each site very carefully avoids the 
Howey definition by sidestepping “investment” and “profit.”  For 
instance, note how careful Kickstarter is on its website: 
      What do backers get in return? 
      Backers that support a project on Kickstarter get 
an inside look at the creative process, and help that 
project come to life.  They also get to choose from a 
variety of unique rewards offered by the project 
creator.  Rewards vary from project to project, but 
often include a copy of what is being produced (CD, 
DVD, book, etc.) or an experience unique to the 
project. 
 
 23. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.  See also Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 
1, at 895 (“[I]t is difficult to fathom how a financing plan or program that involves the exchange 
of funds for profit-sharing interests in a third-party’s venture over the Internet would not qualify 
as a contract, transaction, or scheme under the Howey test.”). 
 24. See Migliozzi & Flatow, supra note 1. 
 25. See Prosper Marketplace, Inc., Securities Act Release No. 8984, 94 SEC Docket 1913 
(Nov. 24, 2008), (“The loan notes issued by Prosper pursuant to this platform are securities and 
Prosper . . . violated Sections 5(a) and (c) of the Securities Act, which prohibit the offer or sale 
of securities without an effective registration statement or a valid exemption from 
registration.”). 
 26. Cf. Joan MacLeod Heminway, How Congress Killed Investment Crowdfunding: A Tale 
of Political Pressure, Hasty Decisions, and Inexpert Judgments that Begs for a Happy Ending, 
102 KY. L.J. 865, 865 (2014) [hereinafter Heminway, Investment Crowdfunding] (“Legally, 
entrepreneurs could not offer or sell a profit-sharing or revenue-sharing interest in the project 
or business for which they sought funding unless the offering was registered under the Securities 
Act of 1933 . . .”); id. at 877 (“Histories of the crowdfunding movement and investment 
crowdfunding are related in varying degrees of detail and with varying areas of emphasis.  
Many, if not most, of these histories, however, ignore the reality that various crowdfunding 
websites have been offering and selling investment interests that are securities without 
registering those offerings under the 1933 Act.”). 
 27. See, e.g., Bradford, Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 16 (“Kickstarter and IndieGoGo are 
the leading reward/pre-purchase crowdfunding sites.”). 
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      Project creators keep 100% ownership of their 
work, and Kickstarter cannot be used to offer equity, 
financial returns, or to solicit loans.28 
IndieGoGo is even more direct: 
      Can I offer my contributors shares in my venture 
or a return on their investment? 
      Campaign owners are not allowed to offer any 
form of “security” (as such term is defined in the 
Securities Act of 1933).  This means that campaign 
owners are not allowed to offer perks such as notes, 
stocks, treasury stocks, security futures, security-based 
swaps, bonds or debentures.  For a comprehensive list, 
please take a look at the Securities Act of 1933 on the 
SEC website.29 
It goes without saying that these sites are precisely avoiding the 
Howey definition—notably, that this is not a for-profit “investment,” 
but rather it is consumption.  Backers receive, for example, a Pebble 
watch, but not any shares in the company making the watch.30 
The fact that sites like BuyaBeerCompany.com and ProFounder 
lost enforcement actions and Kickstarter and IndieGoGo operate 
seemingly without regulatory interference does not, of course, settle 
the matter.  At a conceptual level, one could be forgiven for 
wondering whether a Supreme Court case from 1946 should be the 
arbiter of taste in crowdfunding.  More practically, it leaves the 
question of mixed motivation unanswered.  As one expert observes: 
Crowdfunding interests in the form of investment 
contracts are especially difficult to categorize since the 
range of terms they embody is particularly fluid.  
 
 28. Kickstarter Basics, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/help/faq/kickstarter+ 
basics?ref=footer (last visited Oct. 31, 2015) (emphasis added). 
 29.  Prohibited Perks, INDIEGOGO, https://support.indiegogo.com/hc/en-us/articles/ 
204255166 (last visited Oct. 31, 2015) (emphasis added).  I leave aside here the question of how 
realistic it would be for someone contributing on IndieGoGo to decipher the 1933 Act. 
 30. See Pebble Time Kickstarter, supra note 4.  See also Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 
1, at 896 (“Many crowdfunding websites raise funds to support the production of goods and 
services by artists and others, and these crowdfunded ventures often reward funders with free or 
discounted products or services created or sold by the funded business.”); Hazen, supra note 1, 
at 1739 (“If a crowdfunding effort seeks donations without any express or implied possibility of 
a return to the donor, there is no offering of securities, and thus, the securities laws are not 
implicated.”). 
 
22 HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL Vol. 12:1 
Investors may have mixed motives in purchasing them.  
While they have an expectation of “profits” generated 
by from a common enterprise and the efforts of others, 
they also may acquire these financial and related 
interests with the clear understanding that they will 
have no governance rights over the enterprise and will 
never recoup the full value of their investment through 
current returns, repayment or resale.31 
As such, Congress and the SEC have stepped into the game as part of 
the JOBS Act to try to provide a coherent regulatory framework.  
Unfortunately, as Part II discusses, the statute and proposed 
regulations, by trying to be too many things to too many people, 
ultimately do not succeed. 
 
III. OVERLY AMBITIOUS REGULATIONS, 
POOR ALTERNATIVES 
 
Against the backdrop of existing crowdfunding, in 2012 Congress 
added section 4(a)(6) to the 1933 Act, and in October 2013 the SEC 
promulgated proposed rules for crowdfunding.32  First, I provide an 
overview of the new statute and proposed rules.  Next, I conclude that 
the current regulatory framework is overly ambitious in its attempt 
both to foster crowdfunding, as well as to deter fraud.  To be sure, 
there are ambiguities—both in terms of the statute’s language and 
attendant liability—but the fatal flaw of the current statutory and 
regulatory framework is the imposition of very high transaction costs. 
 
A.   CROWDFUND ACT AND PROPOSED RULES 
 
1.  Legal Framework 
 
As part of the 2012 JOBS Act, the United States Congress 
passed Title III of the JOBS Act, “The Capital Raising Online While 
Deterring Fraud and Unethical Non-Disclosure Act of 2012” 
(“CROWDFUND Act”), now included in section 4(a)(6) of the 1933 
 
 31. Heminway, What Is a Security, supra note 13, at 368. 
 32. As of September 2015, we are still awaiting final rules from the SEC. 
 
Fall 2015 CROWDFUNDING DELUSIONS 23 
Act.33  Likely concerned with the SEC’s failure to implement 
exceptions in the past,34 the guidance is unusually specific.  Section 
4(a)(6) specifies that the issuer cannot raise more than one million 
dollars during a twelve-month period.35  It bifurcates investors into 
two categories: those whose annual income or net worth is less than 
$100,000 and those whose annual income or net worth is at or above 
that amount.36  The aggregate amount sold to the former during any 
twelve-month period cannot exceed the greater of $2,000 or five 
percent of the purchaser’s annual income or net worth; by contrast, 
the amount sold to the latter cannot exceed ten percent of annual 
income or net worth not to exceed $100,000.37  It also specifies that 
the transaction must be conducted via a registered broker-dealer or 
funding portal.38 
Significantly, section 4A(b)(1) imposes disclosure requirements 
on issuers; notably, offerings above $500,000 require audited 
financials, offerings between $100,000 and $500,000 must be reviewed 
by an independent public accountant, and offerings below $100,000 
require disclosure of the issuer’s latest tax return and financial 
statements certified by an officer.39  Section 4A(b)(4) in turn requires 
ongoing disclosure to investors at least annually.40  Finally, while 
these crowdfunded securities would be “covered” securities exempt 
from state blue sky laws,41 there would be a one-year holding period 





 33. See C. Steven Bradford, The New Federal Crowdfunding Exemption:  Promise 
Unfulfilled, 40 SEC. REG. L.J. 195 (2012) (providing detailed description and analysis of statute) 
[hereinafter Bradford, Unfulfilled]. 
 34. See infra notes 152–155 and accompanying text.  
 35. Securities Act of 1933 § 4(a)(6)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(A) (2012). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Securities Act of 1933 § 4A(b)(1)(D), 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(b)(1)(D) (2012). 
 40. Securities Act of 1933 § 4A(b)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(b)(4) (2012). 
 41. Securities Act of 1933 § 18(b)(4)(C), 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4)(C) (2012). 
 42. Securities Act of 1933 § 4A(e)(1), 15 U.S.C. §77d-1(e)(1) (2012).  There are exceptions 
to the 1-year rule, notably for transfers to accredited investors and family members.  Id. 
 
24 HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL Vol. 12:1 
In its 585-page proposed rules,43 the SEC ended up largely 
repeating section 4(a)(6).44  The rules did, however, try to achieve 
three things: they tried to (i) clarify some ambiguities and nuances in 
section 4(a)(6), (ii) suggest an approach to fairly esoteric concepts 
such as integration and 1934 Act triggers, and most importantly, and 
(iii) expand upon disclosure requirements and estimated costs. 
The SEC clarified that if both the investor’s income and net 
worth are less than $100,000, then the $2,000 or five percent 
(whichever is greater) applies,45 and that the issuer may rely on the 
intermediary to assess these limits.46  It also specified that issuers must 
use a single intermediary47 who, in turn, must register with the SEC as 
a broker or funding portal, as well as join FINRA.48 
It also noted that section (4)(a)(6) offerings are not to be 
integrated with other offerings, thereby isolating the one million 
dollar cap only to 4(a)(6) offerings,49 and that crowdfunded securities 
are exempt from the 2,000 holder limit which would otherwise trigger 
full reporting obligations under section 12(g) of the Securities and 
Exchange Act of 1934 (“1934 Act”).50 
Perhaps most importantly, it expanded on disclosure 
requirements and estimated costs.  The issuer must have some sort of 
a business plan and file a new Form C with both financial and non-
financial disclosures.51  The proposed rules, of course, are subject to 
change—as frustrated commentators have noted, however, the final 
rules have not yet been released.52 
 
 43. Crowdfunding, Exchange Act Release Nos. 9470; 70741, WL 5770346 (Oct. 23, 2013) 
[hereinafter SEC Release No. 9470]; see also Press Release, SEC, SEC Issues Proposal on 
Crowdfunding (Oct. 23, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/ 
1370540017677. 
 44. See, e.g., Brian Korn, SEC Proposes Crowdfunding Rules, FORBES (Oct. 23, 2013, 2:41 
PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/deborahljacobs/2013/10/23/sec-proposes-crowdfunding-rules/ 
(“[T]oday’s proposed rules are a virtual reprint of the parameters outlined in the JOBS Act.”). 
 45. SEC Release No. 9470, supra note 43, at 10. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 128. 
 49. Id. at 16. 
 50. Id. at 275. 
 51. Id. at 43. 
 52. See, e.g., Kendall Almerico, SEC Delays Equity Crowdfunding Piece of JOBS Act for 
Another Year, FORBES (Dec. 14, 2014), http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/240558; Kevin 
Harrington, Will JOBS Act Equity Crowdfunding Ever Happen?, FORBES (Feb. 3, 2015, 2:42 
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2.  Critiques 
 
There are numerous critiques of the exemption.  Most focus on 
the ambiguities and poor drafting—both in terms of what the rule 
mandates, as well as uncertain implications for liability.  While I 
discuss these criticisms first, my contention is that the fatal flaw in the 
legal framework is the imposition of very high transaction costs—
notably on issuers, but also on intermediaries.  Put simply, the 
exemption is too expensive to be meaningful. 
 
a.  Ambiguities and Poor Policy Choices 
 
The foundational statute, section 4(a)(6), is far from a paragon of 
clarity, and one could endlessly debate the policy choices that have 
been made around investment limits, requirements for 
intermediaries, and the like.  As one might expect, there have been 
numerous criticisms of the exemption.  One scholar, who has written 
about the “ambiguities, internal inconsistencies, and outright drafting 
errors”53 in the statute, laments: 
The new crowdfunding exemption is disappointing.  It is 
poorly drafted, leaving many ambiguities and 
inconsistencies for the SEC or the courts to resolve.  Its 
mandatory disclosure requirements are too complicated 
and expensive for the small offerings it is designed to 
facilitate.  Its individual investment limits are too high, 
exposing investors to more risk than many of them can 
afford.  Its regulation of crowdfunding intermediaries is 
haphazard, unnecessarily disadvantaging non-broker 
intermediaries, but failing to include a crucial investor 
protection provision.  Its failure to include a “substantial 
compliance” provision to protect innocent and 
immaterial violations, coupled with its complicated 
regulatory requirements, makes inadvertent violations 
likely. . . .  Because of these and a number of other 
 
PM) http://www.forbes.com/sites/kevinharrington/2015/02/03/will-jobs-act-equity-crowdfunding-
ever-happen/ (“Almost three years [after the JOBS Act] the SEC still has not published the 
final rules, and JOBS Act equity crowdfunding remains on hold.  How is this possible?”). 
 53. Bradford, Unfulfilled, supra note 33, at 215. 
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problems, the promise of crowdfunded securities 
offerings remains unfulfilled.  The new exemption is not 
the regulatory panacea crowdfunding supporters hoped 
for, and it is unlikely to spawn a crowdfunding 
revolution.54 
Another expert summarizes the legislation as “an overwhelming 
mishmash of regulatory requirements.”55 
Crucially, liability is also far from clear. More specifically, 
section 4A(c) states that “[a]n action brought under this paragraph 
shall be subject to the provisions of Section 12(b) and Section 13, as if 
the liability were created under Section 12(a)(2).”56  Leaving aside for 
the moment the interpretative ambiguities in section 12(a)(2),57 one 
wonders why the statute says “as if”?  Perhaps the phrase has no 
significance, or perhaps it is meant to address the oddity of using 
section 12(a)(2) to police crowdfunding: the US Supreme Court has 
held that section 12(a)(2) applies only to public offerings such as 
initial public offerings (IPOs),58 yet crowdfunding is not such a 
registered public offering.  And this is not even to mention that the 
liability of the funding portals remains poorly defined59—an aspect 
that could emerge as important as unsuccessful issuers become 
bankrupt and judgment-proof, while plaintiffs look for redress. 
My point is not to pile onto these criticisms.  While I am in no 
way defending the drafting, it does not bother me as much because it 
is fairly typical of securities statutes and regulations.  Overall, the 
securities laws are riddled with ambiguities and interpretative puzzles, 
not to mention very debatable policy choices—yet somehow as 
 
 54. Bradford, Unfulfilled, supra note 33, at 198.  
 55. Stuart R. Cohn, The New Crowdfunding Registration Exemption: Good Idea, Bad 
Execution, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1433, 1437 (2012). 
 56. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 4A(c)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(C) (2012). 
 57. See, e.g., Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 567 (1995).  Section 12(a) seems to 
impose a negligence standard.  The statutory language says that any person who “offers or sells 
a security . . . by means of a prospectus or oral communication, which includes an untrue 
statement of a material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the 
statements . . . not misleading . . . and who shall not sustain the burden of proof that he did not 
know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of such untruth or omission, 
shall be liable . . . to the person purchasing such security from him . . . .”  Securities Act of 1933 § 
12(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(2) (2000). 
 58. See Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 566. 
 59. See generally C. Steven Bradford, Shooting the Messenger: The Liability of 
Crowdfunding Intermediaries for the Fraud of Others, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 371 (2014). 
 
Fall 2015 CROWDFUNDING DELUSIONS 27 
securities lawyers we manage. 
My own view, moreover, is that in the end it will simply be the 
high costs of complying with the crowdfunding framework that will be 
its ultimate undoing. 
 
b.  Exorbitant Cost 
 
My basic objective when trying to get a rough sense of cost is to 
understand how the cost of using the crowdfunding exemption would 
compare to that of going public, where the underwriting fee is 
typically seven percent, but one needs to add additional costs for a 
rough estimate of about ten percent, already quite high.60  
Fortunately, coming up with a rough estimate turned out to be 
relatively straightforward.  First, I took data from the SEC’s Proposed 
Rules,61 which appears in three bands of offering sizes: less than 
$100,000, $100,000-$500,000, and greater than $500,000.  I then tried 
to characterize a cost as initial or ongoing (or both), then simply 
added up each type of cost and calculated it as a percentage of the 
mid-point of each offering band; namely, $50,000, $250,000, and 
















 60. See, e.g., Hsuan-Chi Chen & Jay R. Ritter, The Seven Percent Solution, 55 J. FIN. 1105, 
1105−31 (2000). 
 61. See SEC Release No. 9470, supra note 43, at 358–59. 
 












































Costs per issuer 
for obtaining 
EDGAR access 
codes on Form 
ID 
x  $60 $60 $60 
Costs per issuer 
for preparation 
and filing of 
Form C for 
each offering 
x  $6,000 $6,000 $6,000 
Costs per issuer 
for preparation 




x  $400 $400 $400 
Costs per issuer 
for preparation 
and filing of 
annual report 
on Form C-AR 
 x $4,000 $4,000 $4,000 
Costs for 
annual review 








Costs per issuer 
for preparation 
and filing of 
Form C-TR to 
terminate 
reporting 
  $600 $600 $600 
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Initial costs $8,960-13,960 $35,210-65,210 
$72,060-
147,060 
Ongoing costs $4,000 $18,350 $32,700 
Average offering62 $50,000 $300,000 $750,000 
Initial costs % 18-28% 12-22% 10-20% 
Ongoing costs % 8% 6% 5% 
 
The results are, to put it mildly, discouraging: depending on the 
size of the offering and the estimate range, anywhere from ten to 
twenty-eight percent in initial costs alone—with the smaller offerings 
estimated to be significantly more expensive on a percentage basis.  
One could be forgiven for wondering whether an entrepreneur would 
be willing to bear these substantial transaction costs—consider, for 
example, a small offering where almost three dollars of every ten 
dollars raised would be going to intermediaries and compliance.  As 
one observer laments: 
Can this new regulatory-laden exemption be useful to 
small entrepreneurs?  It is difficult to imagine that for 
offerings under $250,000 either issuers or 
intermediaries would be willing to undertake the time, 
cost and risk of potential liabilities.  The mandated use 
of intermediaries, the significant role that 
intermediaries are expected to play, and the mandated 
disclosures all point to an impracticable exemption for 
relatively small offerings.63 
Beyond the issuers themselves, there are also estimated costs to 
serve as an intermediary, which I summarize below, directly from the 





       62.  I assume the midpoint, as the SEC does.  See Proposed Rules, supra note 61, at 358 
n.918. 
 63. Cohn, supra note 55, at 13; see also Korn, supra note 44 (“To produce an offering 
disclosure document, enlist a funding portal, run background checks and file an annual report 
year after year might well cost upwards of $100,000.”). 
 64. SEC Release No. 33-9470, supra note 43, at 385–86; see also Heminway, Investment 
Crowdfunding, supra note 26, at 883 (“Potential intermediaries also face significant costs, 
including the cost of registration.”). 
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 Initial Cost Ongoing Cost 
Intermediaries that register as 
brokers 
$770,000 $220,000 
Intermediaries that register as 
funding portals 
$417,000 $90,000 




To the extent they are accurate, these costs are arguably less 
troubling since the intermediary would be a repeat player who could 
presumably spread these costs across many offerings.  One arguably 
concerning aspect of the cost structure, however, would be that it 
would seem to encourage existing broker-dealers to register as 
funding portals—something which would presumably discourage new 
entrants into the funding portal business. 
Of course, all of these are just estimates taken from proposed 
SEC rules.65  But one might surmise that the statute will fail “in its 
primary purpose to assist entrepreneurs and others seeking to raise 
small amounts of capital through broad-based solicitation.”66  Put 
simply, “[w]hy and how does the crowdfunding exemption come up 
short in achieving its objectives?  In one word, the answer is: costs.”67 
As one observer sums up: 
The proposed rules are extremely impractical because 
of the restrictions and procedural hurdles a 
crowdfunding issuer, investor and funding portal will 
have to endure to raise capital.  Compared to other 
forms of crowdfunding and capital raising, equity 
crowdfunding to the public has the worst “bang for 
your buck” in all of corporate finance.68 
 
 65. Heminway, Investment Crowdfunding, supra note 26, at 884 (“Although the SEC has 
estimated the compliance costs attendant to each aspect of its rulemaking under the 
CROWDFUND Act, the actual costs and realizable benefits of the crowdfunding exemption, as 
implemented through the SEC’s rulemaking, will depend on the number and nature of the 
issuers, investors, and intermediaries that participate in investment crowdfunding—which are 
unknown at the present time.”). 
 66. Cohn, supra note 55, at 1; see also id. at 6 (“Promoters seeking to raise small amounts 
from small investors are now subject to such a wide range of disclosure and regulatory 
requirements that it is hard to imagine typical crowdfunding promotions being carried out under 
such conditions.”). 
 67. Heminway, Investment Crowdfunding, supra note 26, at 880. 
 68. Korn, supra note 44, at 2 (emphasis added). 
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It would simply be too expensive for issuers to use the exemption 
to raise money, and it goes without saying that entrepreneurs are 
well-attuned to costs.69  To be fair, one should grant that the 
transaction costs are imposed in an attempt to minimize the risk of 
fraud, especially given the SEC’s historical focus on “micro-cap” 
fraud.70  Notwithstanding this noble intention, however, there are at 
least two problems.  The first is whether the mechanisms set in 
place—notably the expectations of funding portals to review 
information with investors, answer questions, make sure investors 
have not exceeded the 12-month aggregate investment limits, avoid 
conflicts of interest, and the like71—are realistic.  Yet even assuming 
that these mechanisms will operate perfectly, there remains the 
question of whether the transaction costs outweigh the investor-
protection benefits in the sense that the former are so high that the 
exemption is, ab initio, a non-starter.72 
The supervening irony in all of this, of course, is how the 
regulatory framework increases transaction costs for a funding 
mechanism fundamentally created because of a technology that 
reduces transaction costs—the Internet. 
 
B.   POOR ALTERNATIVES 
 
Given these limitations, are there other possible exemptions 
under which crowdfunding might flourish?  The short answer is no, 
but in order to arrive at this conclusion an overview of other 
possibilities is in order.73  In a nutshell, the statutory exemptions are 
too vague as to be practical, and neither Regulation D nor Regulation 
 
 69. See, e.g., Sherwood Neiss, It might cost you $39K to crowdfund $100K under the SEC’s 
new rules, VENTUREBEAT (Jan. 2, 2014, 2:14 PM), http://venturebeat.com/2014/01/02/it-might-
cost-you-39k-to-crowdfund-100k-under-the-secs-new-rules/. 
 70. See Bradford, Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 105 and accompanying text.  
 71. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933 § 4A(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a) (2015).  
 72. See also Cohn, supra note 55, at 11 (“During the rush to promote legislation to aid small 
companies, did anyone point out to Congressional members or staff that the requirement to 
certify financial statements by the CEO is not required for any other federal or state registration 
exemption, that financial statements are not required for Rule 504 small business exemption for 
offerings up to $1 million, and that audited financial statements are expensive and rarely 
available for small businesses?”). 
 73. Needless to say, this section does not approach a comprehensive overview of offering 
exemptions under the 1933 Act. 
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A fit the bill.  For their part, new state crowdfunding exemptions, 
while superficially attractive, are unlikely to become significant. 
To begin, one might consider two statutory exemptions, sections 
4(a)(2) and 4(a)(5) of the 1933 Act.  Section 4(a)(2), which simply 
states that “the provisions of section 5 shall not apply to transactions 
by an issuer not involving a public offering,”74 is problematic for two 
reasons: first and more generally, its meaning is still quite fuzzy nearly 
a century after drafting;75 second and more specifically, it remains 
unclear whether crowdfunding is “public” or “private.”76  Section 
4(a)(5), permitting offerings to one or more accredited investors,77 is 
similarly of marginal use: crowdfunding involves the general public, 
not accredited investors,78 and this statutory exemption has effectively 
been superseded by Regulation D. 
One should quite naturally ask about Regulation D, the most 
important set of exemptions in the securities laws.  Regulation D is 
comprised of three distinct exemptions: Rules 504, 505, and 506.  First 
and foremost, Regulation D does not allow solicitation and 
advertising79—a limitation that makes it unattractive for 
crowdfunding.80  There are two limited exceptions to this ban, but 
neither would really help with crowdfunding.81 
 
 74. Securities Act of 1933 § 4(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(2) (2015). 
 75. See generally SEC v. Ralston Purina Corp., 346 U.S. 119 (1953). 
 76. See infra notes 167-71.  
 77. Section 4(a)(5) of the 1933 Act exempts from registration “transactions involving offers 
or sales by an issuer solely to one or more accredited investors, if the aggregate offering price of 
an issue of securities offered in reliance on this paragraph does not exceed the amount allowed 
under section 3(b)(1) of this title, if there is no advertising or public solicitation in connection 
with the transaction by the issuer or anyone acting on the issuer’s behalf, and if the issuer files 
such notice with the Commission as the Commission shall prescribe.”  Securities Act of 1933 § 
4(a)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(5) (2015). 
 78. Accredited investor defined in 15 U.S.C. § 77b(15)(ii) (2015), which essentially defers 
the definition to the SEC.  See infra note 81. 
 79. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c) (2015). 
 80. See, e.g., Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 1, at 918 (“The most serious obstacle to 
using Regulation D to exempt crowdfunded offerings from registration is its overall prohibition 
of general solicitation and advertising.”). 
 81. The first is that solicitation and advertising are allowed if all the purchasers are 
accredited investors, and their accredited status is verified.  See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(c) (2015).  
As discussed below, however, accredited investors would not be the target audience in a 
crowdfunding context.  See infra notes 83–85 and accompanying text.  The second is that 
solicitation and advertising are allowed under 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b)(1) (2015)—usually this 
applies if the offering is limited to states that provide for a registration and disclosure document, 
or to states that limit sales to accredited investors.  As discussed below, however, section 
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Rule 506, which permits offerings of unlimited size,82 would 
really not be applicable because it can be used only with 
sophisticated83 or accredited84 investors—neither of which 
presumably fits crowdfunding.85  Rule 505, allowing offerings up to 
five million dollars,86 also applies to accredited investors—there is an 
exception for up to thirty-five nonaccredited (and unsophisticated) 
investors,87 but this threshold is significantly too low for 
crowdfunding. 
The situation with Rule 504, which allows offerings up to one 
million dollars,88 is significantly more nuanced.  On the one hand, it 
looks very attractive: It does not require either initial or ongoing 
disclosure, does not require funding portals, and can be sold to an 
unlimited number of unaccredited and unsophisticated investors.89  
The problem with Rule 504, however, stems from that fact that its 
offerings are not “covered” securities, and are thus subject to the 
state blue sky laws—given the inherently interstate nature of 
crowdfunding with the Internet,90 this restriction becomes very 
problematic.  In the words of one scholar: 
Assuring compliance with Rule 504 for a crowdfunded 
venture is not straightforward.  It may be difficult to 
determine the states in which crowdfunding interests 
 
230.504 is of limited use given the interstate nature of crowdfunding.  See infra notes 89–91. 
 82. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2015). 
 83. The definition of sophisticated is notoriously vague in the securities laws.  See, e.g., C. 
Edward Fletcher, Sophisticated Investors Under the Federal Securities Laws, 1988 DUKE L.J. 
1081 (1988). 
 84. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2015).  The most significant is subsection 230.501(a)(5), 
which includes natural persons whose net worth (excluding primary residence) exceeds $1 
million, or whose income over the past two years exceeds $200,000 (or $300,000 if married, filing 
jointly). 
 85. See, e.g., Darian M. Ibrahim, Equity Crowdfunding: A Market for Lemons?, 100 MINN. 
L. REV. (forthcoming 2016), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2539786 (“a true crowd-based 
approach requires opening up the process to more than accredited investors”). 
 86. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.505 (2015). 
 87. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.505(b)(2)(ii), (e)(iv) (2015). 
 88. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (2015). 
 89. See, e.g., Cohn, supra note 55, at 13–14 (“Rule 504, [codified in 17 C.F.R. § 230.504], for 
example, also a federal registration exemption for offerings up to $1 million, does not require a 
disclosure document, does not require the use of an intermediary, does not require any investor 
qualification regarding education or understanding of risks, and does not require annual and 
other reports to the SEC and investors.”). 
 90. See infra note 121 and accompanying text.  
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are offered and sold, and assuming that the applicable 
state laws meet the proper threshold level of investor 
protection, the cost of complying with multiple state 
laws could be high, if not prohibitive.91 
As such, while Rule 504 cannot be categorically excluded, it 
presents significant challenges; indeed, if it were a viable option, then 
presumably there would have been less lobbying for a new and 
distinct crowdfunding exemption. 
Regulation A/A+ is even less attractive.  Section 3(b)(1) has for 
decades granted the SEC exemptive authority for offerings under five 
million dollars.92  The SEC used this authority to promulgate 
Regulation A.93  At first glance, Regulation A might appear attractive 
to crowdfunding because it allows solicitation and advertising.94  
Unfortunately, though, Regulation A is problematic for two principal 
reasons.  First, it is not a “covered” security and hence would also be 
subject to the state blue sky laws and all the attendant problems this 
would present for issuers.95  Second, and perhaps more significantly, it 
requires disclosure in the form of a “mini-registration” statement,96 
whose cost and difficulty is generally considered to be a central factor 
in Regulation A’s general lack of success.97  Overall, “the expense of 
producing the offering circular, in addition to the costs associated 
with state securities law compliance, makes this exemption too costly 
for many crowdfunded ventures.”98 
 
 91. Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 1, at 919–20. 
 92. See 28 U.S.C. § 77c(b)(1) (2015). 
 93. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251–.263 (2015). 
 94. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.254–.255 (2015). 
 95. See, e.g., Hazen, supra note 1, at 1762 (“Regulation A, which, at least in theory, could 
be used for crowdfunding, does not preclude state law from mandating its own registration and 
disclosure.”). 
 96. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.254(a) (2015); see also Hazen, supra note 1, at 1746 (“Unlike the 
other small issue exemptions, Regulation A is available for offerings using a general solicitation 
of investors but is conditioned upon dissemination of a disclosure document.”); Michael B. 
Dorff, The Siren Call of Equity Crowdfunding, 39 J. CORP. L. 493, 502 (2014) (“Regulation A 
offerings may be made for up to $5 million, which should be ample for early round financing of 
small start-ups.  But Regulation A still requires issuers to file a document with the SEC, Form 1-
A, that involves considerable disclosure.”). 
 97. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-839, SECURITIES REGULATION: 
FACTORS THAT MAY AFFECT TRENDS IN REGULATION A OFFERINGS (2012) (noting 
significant delays in SEC review of Regulation A filings as well as high abandonment rate by 
issuers). 
 98. Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 1, at 921. 
 
Fall 2015 CROWDFUNDING DELUSIONS 35 
Perhaps in an attempt to revive Regulation A, the JOBS Act 
added section 3(b)(2) which exempts offerings up to fifty million 
dollars.99  In addition, an offering limit that is ten times greater, these 
new offerings, known as “Regulation A+” or “Tier 2 Regulation A,” 
are also “covered” securities.100  The fundamental problem as it might 
relate to crowdfunding, however, is that these new offerings require 
significant initial and ongoing disclosure—including audited financial 
statements, and annual and semi-annual reports.101  To the extent 
these are even more onerous than section 4(a)(6)’s reporting 
requirements, this new option becomes a nonstarter. 
Finally, we are left with new crowdfunding exemptions crafted 
by the states.102  While superficially attractive, these new exemptions 
are unlikely to have much impact given the interstate nature of the 
Internet and crowdfunding.103  Phrased more technically, such state 
exemptions can only exist if they can be fit into the intrastate offering 
exemption, section 3(a)(11) of the 1933 Act, which is interpreted 
strictly and requires that the issuer and all offerees be in-state, not to 
mention that the proceeds be used in-state as well.104  While in theory 
 
 99. See Securities Act of 1933 § 3(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b)(2) (2012). 
 100. See Amendments For Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under the Securities 
Act (Regulation A), Securities Act Release No. 2501, WL 1788375 (Mar. 2015). 
 101. See id. 
 102. See, e.g., Stacy Cowley, Tired of Waiting for U.S. to Act, States Pass Crowdfunding 
Laws and Rules, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/04/business/small 
business/states-pass-crowdfunding-laws-for-small-businesses.html?_r=0 (“Twenty-two states 
and the District of Columbia have enacted such rules, nine of them within the last six months.  
Eleven states are considering creating such laws and procedures. Three more states—Florida, 
Illinois, and New Mexico—have rules or legislation awaiting the governor’s signature.”); 
Herrick K. Lidstone, Jr., Crowdfunding in Colorado Is Now Available: Let The Offerings Roll, 
COLO. BAR ASS’N: BUS. LAW NEWSL., Aug. 2015, http://www.cobar.org/index.cfm/ID/22954/ 
subID/29470/CORP/#Crowdfunding. 
 103. See, e.g., Am. Liberty Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 173 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (“[T]he 
Internet represents an instrument of interstate commerce . . . .”); Heminway & Hoffman, supra 
note 1, at 959–60 (“[T]he inherent cross-border nature of Internet securities offerings (including 
crowdfunded offerings).”). 
 104. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933 § 3(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (2015); Exemption for 
Local Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 4434, WL 61651 (1961); Chapman v. Dunn, 414 
F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1969) (discussing subsection 3(a)(11)); SEC v. Milanowski, Litigation Release 
No. 20536, WL 1820691 (April 23, 2008) (D. Nev. summary judgment entered Mar. 15, 2010) 
(finding fund manager unable to raise 3(a)(11) exemption as a defense to allegations of fraud 
because of his failure to register shares of Fund with SEC); see also Steven Overly, As Federal 
Regulators Move Slowly on Equity Crowdfunding, States Adopt Their Own Rules, WASH. 
POST (Aug. 24, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/capitalbusiness/as-federal-
regulators-move-slowly-on-equity-crowdfunding-states-adopt-their-own-rules/2014/08/22/81 
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these state exemptions might be used for offerings whose out-of-state 
reach could somehow be restricted over the internet,105 they are 
unlikely to be significant.  As one observer notes, “limiting the 
offering pool to residents of a single state—as is required for a 
federally exempt intrastate offering—renders the exemption unusable 
for crowdfunding efforts given the interstate reach of the Internet.”106  
As the SEC has indicated: 
In the context of an offering conducted in accordance 
with state crowdfunding requirements, such measures 
would include, at a minimum, disclaimers and 
restrictive legends making it clear that the offering is 
limited to residents of the relevant state under 
applicable law, and limiting access to information 
about specific investment opportunities to persons 
who confirm they are residents of the relevant state 
(for example, by providing a representation as to 
residence or in-state residence information, such as a 
zip code or residence address).107 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, preliminary research suggests the intrastate 





c6da54-2942-11e4-958c-268a320a60ce_story.html (“Indeed, states can only regulate business 
within their borders.  That means their provisions automatically shrink the scope of a business’s 
crowdfunding efforts to investors who reside within the state.”). 
 105. See, e.g., Hazen, supra note 1, at 1745 (“Small issues that are purely local in nature may 
qualify for section 3(a)(11)’s intrastate exemption, which is not dependent on the size of the 
offering but also would not be suitable for crowdfunding because it cannot be limited to the 
confines of a single state.” (emphasis added)).  
 106. See, e.g., Hazen, supra note 1, at 1749; Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 1, at 912 
n.160 (“While the intrastate offering exemption . . . may be applicable in some situations 
involving crowdfunding, most crowdfunded ventures seek to raise capital from investors 
residing in various states.  Because of its unlikely applicability in this context, we do not further 
analyze the possible application of the intrastate offering exemption in the crowdfunding 
context.”). 
 107. SEC Division of Corporation Finance, Compliance and Disclosure Interpretations, 
Securities Act Rules, Question 141.04, https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/securities 
actrules-interps.htm (August 6, 2015). 
 108. See Ibrahim, supra note 85, at 137 (“[M]y preliminary review of those exemptions finds 
that they have not been used much . . . .”). 
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IV. THE PATH FORWARD 
 
So where do we go from here?  Simply put, my prediction is that 
the new crowdfunding exemption, in trying both to allow 
crowdfunded capital while at the same time protecting investors, is 
doomed to fail.  It is simply not possible to do both in this context. 
In order to arrive at this prediction, I first explore the advantages 
and disadvantages of allowing crowdfunding, then argue that 
unfortunately the two are not necessarily reconcilable.  As such, the 
securities regime faces a stark choice: either allow crowdfunding with 
few restrictions, or ban it. 
 
A.   ARGUMENT: PROS AND CONS 
 
1.     Brilliant Idea 
 
There are a number of strong arguments to be made in favor of 
crowdfunding.  Looking at the problem first from the point of view of 
issuers, public policy should encourage small business growth, and it 
is well known that small businesses face a funding shortfall.  In the 
words of one scholar, “[c]rowdfunding offers significant promise for 
small business issuers, who face a capital funding gap.  Traditional 
sources of business financing—bank lending, venture capital, and 
angel investors—are unavailable to many startups and other very 
small offerings.”109  There is a very modern allure to allowing 
entrepreneurs to raise money using the Internet, which may at least in 
part explain Congress’ enthusiasm for crowdfunding.110 
Looking at the problem through the lens of investors also 
appears compelling.  Crowdfunding epitomizes democratization: why 
 
 109. Bradford, Unfulfilled, supra note 33, at 196; see also Heminway, Investment 
Crowdfunding supra note 26, at 865 (“Even promising small businesses have trouble finding 
friends-and-family, seed, angel, and venture capital in sufficient quantities to allow them to 
succeed and thrive.”); Bradford, Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 5. 
 110. See Ibrahim, supra note 85, at 105 (“In an age where bipartisan support for anything in 
Congress is rare, allowing entrepreneurs to use the Internet to raise money is a rarity: everyone 
seems to like it.”); Heminway, Public/Private, supra note 5, at 485 (“[I]n response to public 
outcry, extensive lobbying efforts, and a perceived political need for the U.S. Congress to do 
something—anything—bipartisan in nature to better serve small businesses in the lingering 
shadows of the recent global financial crisis . . . .”). 
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should unregistered offerings be limited to accredited and 
sophisticated investors, as for example under Rule 506?111  The 
concern becomes particularly acute if one considers two factors 
specific to crowdfunding.  First, why should someone be allowed to 
invest in a Kickstarter or IndieGoGo campaign, yet have to forego 
the upside?112  Second, offshore crowdfunding sites, under laxer 
regulations in other jurisdictions, could appeal to American investors, 
thereby sidestepping American securities regulation113—indeed, my 
rather unscientific sampling of current crowdfunding sites suggests 
this phenomenon is already happening.114 
Overall, then, “crowdfunding enables entrepreneurs to more 
quickly and easily identify supporter-investors who are willing and 
able to fund their businesses and projects. . . .  Crowdfunding gives 
these investors a way to participate in corporate finance that they may 
not otherwise have.”115  The narrative that emerges is very seductive: 
Equity crowdfunding holds the appeal of being 
quintessentially American.  It is the classic rags to 
riches story, where an enterprising young person turns 
a smart idea into a globe-straddling company and 
along the way makes fortunes for those investors 
perspicacious enough to see the idea’s value early 
on.116 
When phrased in this romantic language, who could disagree? 
 
 111. See supra notes 82–85 and accompanying text. 
 112. See, e.g., Bradford, Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 105 (“Investors are already 
contributing substantial amounts of money to unregulated crowdfunding offerings, although not 
for securities.  Those crowdfunding investments are subject to the same risk of loss as 
crowdfunded securities, but do not offer the upside potential of a securities investment.”). 
 113. See, e.g., id. at 14 (“Not surprisingly, given the international reach of the Internet, some 
of those foreign sites also sell to U.S. investors, and some of the investments they sell would 
almost certainly qualify as securities under U.S. law.”). 
 114. See, e.g., BUZZBNK https://www.buzzbnk.org/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2015) (serving U.K.);  
CROWDCUBE, https://www.crowdcube.com (last visited Oct. 30, 2015) (serving U.K.); 
INVESTIERE, https://www.investiere.ch (last visited Oct. 30, 2015) (serving Switzerland); 
SONICANGEL, www.angelgroup.me/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2015) (serving Belgium). 
 115. Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 1, at 931. 
 116. Dorff, supra note 96, at 13; see also Heminway, Investment Crowdfunding, supra note 
26, at 879 (“Given presidential support and bipartisan backing in Congress (after all, who wants 
to oppose a bill that effectively promises to increase and broaden the base of investment capital 
and, perhaps, spur entrepreneurial activity and job creation during an economic downturn?), 
there undeniably was significant political pressure to pass the CROWDFUND Act.”). 
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2.    Dismal Idea 
 
Yet not so fast.  Crowdfunding also presents dramatic risks to 
investors.  Most simply and importantly, investing in small emerging 
companies is risky—and most will fail.117  This problem is exacerbated 
in the crowdfunding context by a number of troubling factors. 
First, issuers that resort to crowdfunding may not have 
traditional financing options—friends and family, angel investors, 
venture capitalists, and banks—available to them.118  And 
unaccredited, unsophisticated investors might perhaps be less 
discerning in their investment strategy.  Consider, for instance, that 
existing crowdfunding platforms have raised money for some unusual 
ventures, apparently including more than $55,000 to fund a potato 
salad.119  Moreover, the offerings are done via the Internet, “a 
common vehicle for securities fraud.”120  The Rule 504 saga of the 
mid-1990s—where the SEC relaxed, then had to reinstate the 
restrictions on solicitation and advertising in Rule 504 offerings based 
on concerns about fraud—is instructive in this regard: 
[I]n the mid-1990s, many companies relied on Rule 
504 for online offerings without registration or any 
disclosure even close to what would be provided in a 
registered offering.  Typically, companies would issue 
stock through the Internet and then provide a bulletin 
 
 117. See, e.g., Cowley, supra note 102, (“Small companies are inherently risky investments—
only half survive for five years, according to government data—and private businesses are not 
required to disclose much about how they operate.  It can be nearly impossible for potential 
investors to really know what risks they face.”); see also Robb Mandelbaum, As the Delay 
Continues on Crowdfunding Rules, Concerns About Investor Risks Grow, N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 
2014), http://boss.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/05/22/as-the-crowdfunding-delay-continues-concerns-
about-the-risks-grow/; Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 1, at 933 (“Small businesses, 
especially start-ups, fail at a relatively high rate, and investors are likely to lose all of their 
investment.”). 
 118. See generally Ibrahim, supra note 85. 
 119. See Jonah Bromwich, Crowd-Funding Gets Wacky, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2014 (“After 
joking with friends, a computer programmer from Ohio named Zack Brown created a campaign 
that asked for contributions to help raise $10 for a homemade batch of potato salad . . . .  The 
campaign raised more than $55,000.”). 
 120. Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 1, at 933, 935 (“Promoters of crowdfunding interests 
often are anonymous individuals and unknown entities.”); Hazen, supra note 1, at 1769 (“If 
history teaches us anything, the lesson is that social media technologies increase rather than 
decrease the potential for fraud.”). 
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board or other online trading vehicle whereby initial 
purchasers could sell their shares to other investors.  
Frequently, these online offerings would be 
accompanied by considerable hype concerning the 
newly issued securities.  In part as a response to these 
so-called “pump and dump” schemes, the SEC 
amended Rule 504 to prohibit not only a general 
solicitation but also to impose restrictions on resale 
unless the securities are registered under state law or 
issued under a state law exemption permitting a 
general solicitation.121 
In addition, the securities are unlikely to be traded on efficient 
markets, where uninitiated investors could effectively “free-ride” on 
the coat tails of professionals.122  There is the additional problem of 
“micro-fraud” perpetuated by and on small issuers whose securities 
are very thinly traded.123 
The additional significant challenge that a small investor would 
face is the difficulty of diversifying bets among various investments—
in other words, it would be impractical with presumably little capital 
to build a portfolio the way venture capital firms do.  The latter, of 
course, realize that they will lose money on many, if not most, of their 
investments.124  The bottom line is that crowdfunding “involves a 
 
 121. Hazen, supra note 1, at 1747–48; see also Revision of Rule 504 of Regulation D, the 
“Seed Capital” Exemption, 64 Fed. Reg. 11090 (Mar. 8, 1999); Heminway & Hoffman, supra 
note 1, at 952 (“The SEC did, in fact, remove the proscription in Rule 504 offerings for a seven-
year period during the 1990s only to reinstate it because of renewed concerns about fraud.”). 
 122. See, e.g., Ibrahim, supra note 85, at 146 (“While there are certainly well-known 
criticisms and shortcoming of the ECMH, it is still at least a crude mechanism that makes 
disclosure work for unsophisticated investors in the public markets context.  Title III 
crowdfunding site would not be efficient markets, so the ECMH cannot benefits its 
unsophisticated participants.”). 
 123. See Microcap Fraud, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/microcap-fraud.shtml; cf. 
Hazen, supra note 1, at 1766 (“Fraud in small packages can be just as effective and damaging to 
the victims, many of whom may be least able to bear the risk of even a small investment in a 
speculative business.”). 
 124. See, e.g., Ibrahim, supra note 85, at 137–38 (“Unsophisticated investors are unlikely to 
appreciate the significant risk of losing their entire investment in a startup that fails (as most 
startups do).  Compare this with angels and VCs who understand that most startups fail and 
therefore diversify for protection.”). 
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potentially dangerous combination of investment risk and relatively 
unsophisticated investors.”125 
In the end, then, the policy arguments in favor and against 
crowdfunding are conducive to a dizzying schizophrenia: 
The relative ease with which an unsophisticated 
investor may lose money in investments with small 
business issuers, the high rate of securities fraud in the 
small business context, and the anonymity of the 
Internet may give us pause about extending exemptive 
relief to crowdfunded offerings.  However, 
crowdfunding has the capacity to fuel small business 
growth and satisfy the demand for a securities market 
that serves the everyman.126 
Given this mess, what to do? 
 
B.   A PESSIMISTIC PREDICTION 
 
My pessimistic prediction, which I fervently hope will prove 
incorrect, is that the current attempt to legalize crowdfunding will 
have precious little impact.  Crowdfunding will likely hobble along in 
a legal grey area.127  At best, what some enterprising issuers might do 
is to parallel offerings: perhaps a small amount to unaccredited 
investors under the new crowdfunding rules,128 but the bulk of the 
 
 125. Bradford, Unfulfilled, supra note 33, at 196; see also Bradford, Crowdfunding, supra 
note 2, at 105 (“Investing in small businesses is very risky.  Small business investments are 
illiquid, and small businesses, especially startups, are much more likely to fail than are more 
established companies.  Losses due to fraud and self-dealing are also much more likely.”). 
Dorff, supra note 96, at 31 (“Eventually, investors will realize that money invested in 
crowdfunding enterprises will nearly always be money lost.”); Bradford, Crowdfunding, supra 
note 2, at 105 (“Crowdfunding possesses no magical properties that prevent investors from 
losing money just like other investors.”). 
 126. Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 1, at 937. 
 127. See, e.g., Harry McCracken, Indiegogo is Getting Ready for Equity Crowdfunding, FAST 
COMPANY (Sept. 14, 2015), available at  http://www.fastcompany.com/3050200/the-big-
idea/indiegogo-is-getting-ready-for-equity-crowdfunding (as the co-founder of the Crowdfunding 
Professional Association puts it, “[f]acilitating regulated investments is very different from giving 
away T-shirts or hats or putting people’s names in the credits of a movie.”); Moira Vetter, In With 
the In Crowd?  The Entrepreneur’s Guide to Crowdfunding (Or Not), FORBES (July 31, 2015), 
available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/moiravetter/2015/ 07/31/in-with-the-in-crowd-the-
entrepreneurs-guide-to-crowdfunding-or-not/ (“SEC compliance can be mind numbing.  Equity 
crowdfunding comes with regulatory responsibilities that may be too much for you to take on.”). 
 128. Perhaps even to just below the $100,000 or $500,000 thresholds, to avoid the more 
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offering to accredited investors under Regulation D or perhaps even 
the new Regulation A+. 
The other intriguing option is for companies—both startups 
eventually looking for venture capital, and those well-funded, deep-
pocketed ones—to continue to use the existing nonequity 
crowdfunding platforms as a clever and inexpensive way to test 
products, while at the same time passing the costs to the backers.129 
The more interesting question, though, is how to conceptualize a 
path forward.  My argument is simple: we are deluding ourselves if we 
think we can have it both ways.  Crowdfunding simply is not 
amenable to investor protection, and disclosure will not solve our 
problem.130  As such, we need to pick our poison: Either make 
crowdfunding readily available, or ban it.  Trying to do too much—as 
section 4(a)(6) and the Proposed Rules arguably do—is a recipe for 
disaster. 
The arguments against banning crowdfunding track the negatives 
outlined above.  Put simply, the notion is that “these investments are 
going to be terrible”131 and that “there is no way to rescue retail 
crowdfunding.  The problem is not with how Congress set up the 
system or how the SEC will eventually implement it.  The problem is 
that this was always a terrible idea.”132  Indeed, in an attempt to 
protect investors, at least one commentator urges the SEC to put an 
end to section 4(a)(6) via excessive regulation: 
The best solution would be to scrap the crowdfunding 
portion of the JOBS Act entirely.  But since Congress 
is highly unlikely to reverse itself so quickly, the SEC 
should use the power granted to it by the JOBS Act to 
achieve effectively the same end by piling on so many 
 
onerous financial disclosure requirements that begin at the next level.  See, e.g., Neiss, supra 
note 69. 
 129. See, e.g., Katherine Rosman, Crowdfunding Isn’t Just for the Little Guys: Deep-
Pocketed Companies Test the Market on Indiegogo, WALL ST. J. (July 9, 2014), http://www.wsj. 
com/articles/crowdfunding-isnt-just-for-the-little-guys-1404955610 (“By using these sites [such 
as IndieGoGo], bigger companies are finding they can do valuable market research often while 
passing the costs on to willing donors.”). 
 130. In other words, I remain unconvinced that “a careful balancing of investor protection 
and capital formation” is possible in the crowdfunding context.  See Bradford, Crowdfunding, 
supra note 2, at 8. 
 131. Dorff, supra note 96, at 496. 
 132. Id. at 523. 
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additional investor protections and disclosure 
requirements that portals find it undesirable to list 
crowdfunding opportunities, and businesses are driven 
to look elsewhere for capital.133 
Regardless of whether one might personally agree with this 
assessment, a better policy argument might be to craft a simple 
exemption—perhaps setting maximum investment limits and making 
crowdfunded securities exempt under section 3(a)134—and allow 
investors to spend their money, if they so choose.  The analogy might 
be to gambling or to charitable donations, both of which are legal.135 
I propose this largely because crowdfunding is the perennial 
horse that has already left the barn—not allowing it will lead to 
phenomena such as underground and offshore sites.136  There is also 
something odd about taking people’s money but disallowing any 
investment—as just one telling example, RocketHub puts investments 
in the same category as alcohol, drugs, gambling, and pornography.137  
There is, of course, the question of whether startups themselves will 
want to sell shares in themselves broadly or to a select few 
investors138—but allowing crowdfunding as an investment will 
eventually answer this question.  If investors are willing to part with 
their money, why not give them some upside potential—as elusive 
 
 133. Dorff, supra note 96, at 498; see also id. at 523 (“At this point, the SEC’s best option is 
to kill retail crowdfunding with excessive regulation.”). 
 134. Cf. Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 1, at 912 (“Section 3(a) does not currently 
provide an exemption for crowdfunding interests.”). 
 135. Cf. id. at 942 (“One way to address the uncertainties created by deregulating the offer 
and sale of crowdfunding interests under the federal securities laws is by regulating those 
transactions under another one or more existing areas of law (e.g., through gambling regulation 
or the regulation of charitable donations) or by regulating them under a new scheme of 
regulation created especially for crowdfunding.”). 
 136. See Cohn, supra note 55, at 4 (“the crowdfunding phenomenon is growing at a rate that 
does not allow for continued benign sweeping under the enforcement radar screen.”). 
   137.  RocketHub’s FAQ section asks “What can NOT be offered as a good or service at this 
time?”  The following goods are not allowed: alcohol, drugs, gambling (including lotteries, 
raffles, or sweepstakes), investment opportunities (including equity, loans, and revenue 
sharing), pornography, and weapons.  RocketHub, FAQS, https://www.rockethub.com/ 
education/faq#not-offered (last visited Oct. 10, 2015) (emphasis added); see also Bradford, 
Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 25 (“there are now no major, publicly accessible equity 
crowdfunding sites in the United States”). 
 138. See, e.g., McCracken, supra note 127 (in the words of the CEO of one startup, “Who 
you have around the table is as important as, if not more important than, the money you’re 
bringing in.”); Vetter, supra note 127 (“I would rather ‘hand pick’ my prospective investors than 
mass market to people I don’t know, who will not be adding strategic value.”). 
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and naïve as it might be, even the possibility of any upside would be 
better than zero.139 
 
C.   TAKING OPPORTUNITIES 
 
Regardless of whether readers might agree or disagree with my 
proposal, the biggest tragedy is that we are missing the opportunity to 
examine major questions in securities regulation: as it turns out, the 
crowdfunding saga presents many themes in microcosm.  More 
obviously, it broaches fundamental dilemmas such as defining 
securities, the small-business funding gap, the relative institutional 
roles of Congress and the SEC, the efficacy of disclosure, and the role 
of intermediaries as gatekeepers.  More subtly, crowdfunding blends 
public and private, uncouples value-added services from capital, and 
asks whether crowds are consistent with efficient markets.  Debating 
these issues would have real value; sadly, though, the framework’s 
failures drown out such discourse. 
 
1.    Some Fundamental Questions 
 
The ambiguities of how to define a “security” have been 
discussed above.140  Crowdfunding would seem to provide a perfect 
opportunity to discuss whether a Unites States Supreme Court 
decision from 1946 should still be the benchmark for defining 
securities well into the twenty first century.141  Similarly, 
crowdfunding forces us to ask whether—notwithstanding the concern 
with “microfraud”142—it makes sense to make the securities laws so 
difficult and expensive for small businesses to comply with.143  As one 
scholar points out: 
Congress could have used crowdfunding as an 
opportunity to re-examine some of the basic premises 
 
 139. It is important to remember that “the crowdfunding backers don’t share in the profits.  
Equity crowdfunders, however, receive actual shares in the companies they back.”  Cowley, 
supra note 102. 
 140. See supra notes 33–60 and accompanying text. 
 141. See supra notes 15–32 and accompanying text. 
 142. See supra notes 118–124 and accompanying text. 
 143. See, e.g., Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 1, at 880 (“Funding small businesses while 
complying with applicable securities laws and regulations is tricky.”). 
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of securities regulation of small businesses and to 
seriously rethink how the Internet can be used to 
protect investors in less traditional, less expensive 
ways.  Instead, it threw together a poorly drafted 
regulatory bundle of old ideas that is complicated, 
expensive, and unlikely to have much of an effect on 
the small business capital gap.144 
Relatedly, crowdfunding could make us re-think what is arguably 
the fundamental premise of the entire securities regime: disclosure.  
There is new research that suggests mandated disclosure has, simply 
put, been a failure.145  In the words of one scholar: “[t]he sheer 
volume of disclosure occasioned by the mandatory disclosure 
regime—especially when some of the information has little, if any, 
relevance in determining market prices or company-specific or 
systemic risks—may render mandatory disclosure ineffective or 
inefficient in serving its desired regulatory objectives.”146 
More specifically, securities exemptions typically require that 
solicitation be accompanied by disclosure147—contrast for example 
Rule 504 (no solicitation, no disclosure) with Regulation A 
(solicitation, disclosure).148  But is this dichotomy correct?  Moreover, 
will the average investor in the “crowd” understand, or even read, the 
disclosures whose creation is at least partially to blame for such high 
transaction costs?149  This concern is only exacerbated when the 
Internet is the offering medium, given its tendency to provide an 
overwhelming amount of information which can be difficult to sift 
through.150 
 
 144. Bradford, Unfulfilled, supra note 2, at 222; see also Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 
1, at 951 (“There also may be a future time at which it would be advisable to initiate an overhaul 
of all small business capital formation regulation.”). 
 145. OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW: 
THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE 33 (Princeton Univ. Press 2014). 
 146. Heminway, What is a Security, supra note 13, at 349. 
 147. See, e.g., Hazen, supra note 1, at 1748 (“Any exemption that involves a general 
solicitation of investors will require an offering circular or other affirmative disclosure.”). 
 148. See supra note 1, at 1763; see also supra notes 81–84 and accompanying text. 
 149. Id.; see also supra notes 64–74 and accompanying text. 
 150. See, e.g., Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 1, at 934 (“the Internet may over-inform 
and, as a result, obfuscate or bury important information in connection with securities 
offerings.”). 
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The crowdfunding debacle also provides an exceptional 
opportunity to consider the relative institutional roles of Congress 
and the SEC.  Sections 4(a)(6) and 4A are drafted in detail that one 
seldom sees in the securities regime—why?151  To put it bluntly, likely 
because the Congress was fed up with the SEC’s inertia on small 
offerings.  It is important in this regard to remember that the SEC for 
decades had the statutory authority under section 3(b)152 and section 
28153 to craft a crowdfunding exemption, but it did not.154  As such, we 
have the legislature trying to do the regulatory agency’s job, perhaps 
with predictable results.155 
The idea of funding portals also invites a conversation on the 
role of intermediaries as gatekeepers in the securities regime.  Given 
our struggles with the bifurcated regulatory regime for broker-
dealers156 on the one hand and investment advisors157 on the other,158 
does it make sense to introduce yet another concept, namely the 
funding portal?159  To the extent it does, might it have been better to 
 
 151. Contrast, for example, with section 10(b) of the 1934 Act which vaguely prohibits “any 
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance . . . .” (codified in 15 U.S.C. 78j (2015)). 
 152. See Securities Act of 1933 § 3(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b)(1) (2012) (“Commission may 
from time to time by its rules and regulations . . . add any class of securities to the securities 
exempted as provided in this section, if it finds that the enforcement of this subchapter with 
respect to such securities is not necessary in the public interest and for the protection of 
investors . . . but no issue of securities shall be exempted under this subsection where the 
aggregate amount at which such issue is offered to the public exceeds $5,000,000.”). 
 153. Section 28 of the 1933 Act is even more generous, noting simply that the “Commission, 
by rule or regulation, may conditionally or unconditionally exempt any person, security, or 
transaction, or any class or classes of persons, securities, or transactions, from any provision or 
provisions of this subchapter or of any rule or regulation issued under this subchapter, to the 
extent that such exemption is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, and is consistent 
with the protection of investors.”  28. U.S.C. § 77z-3 (1998). 
 154. See, e.g., Hazen, supra note 1, at 1749 (“the SEC already had statutory authority to craft 
an exemption that could apply to crowdfunding”); Bradford, Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 87. 
 155. See Cohn, supra note 55, at 15 (“the SEC has a dismal record regarding the interests of 
small business.  Congressional leaders therefore felt compelled to move into the regulatory 
vacuum.  Yet, for all their good intentions, legislators are not experts in the nuances of securities 
laws. . . .”). 
 156. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 77c (a)(4) (2012). 
 157. See Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 202(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) (2015). 
 158. See, e.g., Reza Dibadj, Brokers, Fiduciaries and a Beginning, 30 REV. OF BANKING AND 
FIN. L. 205 (2010). 
 159. Cf. Bradford, Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 49 (“If the investments offered on 
crowdfunding sites are securities, crowdfunding site operators could be brokers subject to 
regulation under the Exchange Act or investment advisers under the Investment Advisers 
Act.”). 
 
Fall 2015 CROWDFUNDING DELUSIONS 47 
introduce something like the “Nomads” on London’s AIM market, as 
at least one commentator has suggested.160 
 
2.   Intriguing Subtleties 
 
So far, I have touched on some fairly obvious issues that 
crowdfunding brings to the fore; namely, defining securities, funding 
small businesses, and questioning disclosure and institutional roles.  
There are, however, additional more subtle topics, which center on 
crowds and efficient markets, the public/private distinction, and 
unbundling value added from capital. 
The entire securities regime putatively revolves around efficient 
markets161 and the mythical reasonable investor.162  But are these 
assumptions applicable when we are talking about crowds?163  One 
scholar puts the question particularly well when she asks: “[d]oes the 
securities-crowdfunding crowd have the attributes of a wise crowd, or 
will it have a tendency to madness?”164  To what extent do crowds 
typify the concerns in behavioral economics and noise theories about 
the efficient market hypothesis?165 
Another nuanced, but conceptually fascinating feature of 
crowdfunding is that it challenges the public/private divide in 
securities regulation.166  Traditionally, the regulatory regime has been 
bifurcated: the entire machinery of public offerings on the public side, 
 
 160. See Ibrahim, supra note 85, at 151–59. 
 161. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market 
Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 550 (1984). 
 162. See Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 240 (1988) (“materiality depends on the 
significance the reasonable investor would place on the withheld or misrepresented 
information.”). 
 163. See, e.g., Joan MacLeod Heminway, Investor and Market Protection in the 
Crowdfunding Era: Disclosing to and for the “Crowd,” 38 VT. L. REV. 827, 829 (2014) 
[hereinafter Heminway, Crowd] (“Individual members of the crowd may or may not have the 
attributes of the reasonable investor—the type of investor protected by U.S. federal securities 
laws and rules.”). 
 164. Id. at 844.  See also Ibrahim, supra note 85, at 148 (“The concept of the “crowd” under 
Title III is messy and ambiguous.”). 
 165. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation: 
Market Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 851, 851–72 (1992); Stephen J. Choi & Adam 
C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1, 3 (2003). 
 166. See Heminway, Public/Private, supra note 5, at 479 (“The very notions of a 
crowdfunded offering and issuer of securities challenge pre-existing public-private 
distinctions.”). 
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and the relatively light-touch on the private side, typically when the 
offering is sold to accredited investors.167  Crowdfunding challenges 
this.  On the one hand, it is an exemption like those offered to 
“private” offerings; on the other, it is “public” in that there is 
solicitation and the securities are offered to the public at large.168  As 
one example of this tension, consider that the JOBS Act had to 
exempt crowdfunded companies from the normal requirement under 
section 12(g) and Rule 12g-1 of the 1934 Act to categorize companies 
with more than two-thousand shareholders and ten million dollars in 
assets to reporting requirements as if they were a public reporting 
company.169  The last time the SEC conflated public and private, 
Regulation A,170 success was not forthcoming171—is the new 
crowdfunding exemption repeating the same mistake? 
Finally, and perhaps most subtly, crowdfunding broaches the 
topic of unbundling governance rights and value-added services from 
capital.  Consider, for instance, that startup companies seeking funds 
from angel investors and venture capital firms typically also receive 
“value-added” services in the form of strategic and management 
guidance, but crowdfunding essentially uncouples these services from 
the transfer of capital itself.  To the extent that startups are thirsting 
for crowdfunding dollars, does this imply they do not value these 
services, or that crowdfunded funds are simply cheaper?172  This idea 
is of course different, but has a conceptual similarity to another form 
of unbundling that occurred in the early days of crowdfunding: that of 
 
 167.  See supra notes 156–159. 
 168. See Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 1, at 929–30 (“Crowdfunded offerings, as 
currently conducted, are not private offerings; by their nature, crowdfunded offerings are not 
limited offerings (in terms of their ability to reach potential investors) and are not isolated 
offers and sales of securities.”). 
 169. Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act of 2012, H.R. 3606, 112th Cong. §§303, 
501 (2nd Sess. 2012) (enacted). 
 170. See Heminway, Public/Private, supra note 5, at 488 (“Regulation A had earlier blurred 
the line between public and private offerings for mandatory disclosure under the 1933 Act by 
requiring limited offering disclosures structured to look like the disclosures used in registered 
public offerings. . . .”). 
 171. See supra notes 92–98 and accompanying text. 
 172. See Ibrahim, supra note 85, at 140 (“the inherent passivity of Title III investors—a 
seeming negative—would actually appeal to entrepreneurs who wish to unbundle the cash and 
value-added service components of traditional entrepreneurial finance”). 
 
Fall 2015 CROWDFUNDING DELUSIONS 49 
unbundling governance rights (notably, voting rights) from capital 




The securities regime in the United States faces a fundamental, 
perhaps intractable, problem: “to reconcile the regulatory 
requirements of 1933 with the realities of the twenty-first century.”174  
Crowdfunding, whose “socio-legal bounds are as yet relatively 
untested,”175 presents a particular challenge: A resolutely twenty-first 
century phenomenon butting heads against a regulatory framework 
designed for the early twentieth century.176 
It is unlikely that the limbo in which crowdfunding finds itself 
will emerge unless we are willing to face a normative choice: Either 
we think that individuals should be able to invest capital in risky 
ventures or not.  If we decide the former, then we should have a 
streamlined regulation with significantly fewer requirements and 
concomitant lower transaction costs.  On the other hand, if we decide 
the latter, then we should simply not allow crowdfunding.  To think 
that we can allow it while at the same time protect investors may be a 
bit of a delusion. 
To the extent my prediction about the new crowdfunding regime 
is accurate, my fervent hope is that we move beyond and learn from 
the opportunity crowdfunding has given us to examine some 








 173. See Heminway, What Is a Security, supra note 13, at 360 (defining unequity as “a 
particular type of financial interest that provides for profit-sharing or revenue-sharing on a 
short-term basis, with no accompanying governance rights”). 
 174. Bradford, Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 150. 
 175. Heminway, Public/Private, supra note 5, at 477. 
 176. Cf. Heminway, Crowd, supra note 163, at 831 (“Crowdfunded securities offerings are a 
relatively recent, high-growth phenomenon borne, at least in part, from frustration with 
traditional capital-raising methods and processes.”). 
